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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
J u r i s d i c t i o n i s c o n f e r r e d on f;he c o u r t p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 
2 6 ( 2 ) In) of r h e U t a h R u l e s of C r i m i n a l P r o c e d u r e a n d U t a h Code Ann. 
§ /B --..I \\ I lull) UiUpii I ^ M I , 'wlieieLiy i de I e n d a u ! iiu i n u i.t 
c o u r t c r i m i n a l a c t i o n may t a k e a n a p p e a l t o t.he c o u i t o f a p p e a l s 
fn>m .MI f i mi mi I o r d e r on a m i s d e m e a n o r o f f e n s e . In i l i i a c a s e t h e 
H o n o r a b l e M i c h a e l K. B u r t o n , J u d g e . T h i r d " i r c u i t Uourl , in ..imJ LI:I. 
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]uiignieMiI -11nl i HI I \I i i I i i HII I i 1 ! n - 11 f f enfio \RRYINC CEALED 
WEAPON, a c l a s s A m i s d e m e a n o r , i n v i o i a t i o i J ,<.- , ' i j-
1 0 - 5 0 4 . A p p e l l a n t p l e d g u i l t y on M<;»y :» ! , il,»,>1 'T'hi* was a 
cond.i I ir li'iiil i d iM IJI IIIIIII III \ unl hi Appi I. 1. in I i ip , ,sprvinri l i i i r i u i i t t o 
a p p e a l t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s d e n i e d of t h e m o t i o n t o s u p p r e s s p u r s u a n t 
t o S t a t e v . S e r v , 758 P . 2 d 9 3 5 , 939 ( U t a h A p p . 1 9 8 8 ) . P u r s u a n t t o 
S t a t e v . MunLova, BS"" I" ' I M1 ' .' lilt .ih .'t, | I I , I I." I s s u e i s 
d i s p o s i t i v e , 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
T h e i „ : - - - : 
U t a h Code An;: 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I . A Warrantless Search of an Automobile for Weapons Is Not 
Justified by the "Public Safety" Exception to the Warrant 
Requirement When All of the Suspects Have Been Identified, 
Handcuffed and Removed From Close Proximity to the Scene of the 
Incident 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
In examining a motion to suppress, the appellate court reviews 
the trial court's findings of fact "under a 'clearly erroneous' 
standard" and the trial court's "ultimate legal conclusions flowing 
from these factual findings under a 'correctness' standard." State 
v. Lopez, 831 P.2d 1040, 1043 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Bradford, 
839 P.2d 866 (Utah App. 1992); see also State v. Pena 869 P.2d 932 
(Utah 1994). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Mr. Barlow appeals his conviction for Carrying a Concealed 
Dangerous Weapon on the grounds that the police officers illegally 
searched a car in which he was a passenger and seized a gun taken 
from a fannypack which was located on the floor of the passenger 
side of the vehicle. This search was conducted without a search 
warrant and was not conducted pursuant to a valid exception to the 
warrant requirement. The state charged Daniel Thomas Barlow in an 
amended information dated February 24, 1994 with Carrying a 
Concealed Dangerous Weapon in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-
504. A motion to suppress the gun was filed with the Third Circuit 
Court, Murray Department, on February 16, 1994. The Honorable 
2 
Mi'-ha^ Burton heard argument on the motion on Mar ::h 22, 2 994. 
Th- defense motion to suppress was denied on grounds that the 
* . . . - vvere authorized to search the vehicle because they were 
legitimately concerned for their safety The trial court ruled 
iri.1L t::ie officers did not have authority to search the vehicle 
• •- " " except" i o n il Il | if; .'-a riant" re.qni r^inent 
because the lannypac.- holding Lhe yum w/cit,,. not "clearly 
incriminating," 
Oi l I lar ch r:i ng a 
Concealed Dangerous Weapon in violation of Utah Code Ann § 76-10-
504 Th i s was a conditional guilty plea. Mr Barlow reserved his 
pursuant to State v. Serv. See also State v. Montova, 858 P. 2d 
1027 (I INI,-fill C t . A pp 1393). The Notice of Appeal was filed on July 
IB ~ »4. 
FACTS 
On August 1 5, 1993, Appellant Danie. - .,.. -is brother, 
Todd Mitchell (hereinafter "Mitchell witnesse. • i 
reside ce. Barlow and 
Mitchell (Mitchell driving) jumped into a hereinafter "car 
#1 ») and followed the suspect and a passenger (hereinafter "car #2) 
1 .< : c " L c i;pa:! lb ex. Moti on (hereinafter "M. 
Ti f) Cai - pulled in, behind car #2, Barlow and his brother 
confronted the occupants of car #2 about their driving pattern, I I 
Tr. 58. 
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At this time, one of the occupants of car #2 ran toward the 
apartment buildings and returned with a handgun. Barlow yelled to 
some onlookers at the apartment complex to call the police. Id. 
Deputies Adamson and Eyre were dispatched to the scene. Adamson 
said "it was dispatched as a fight involving a weapon." M. Tr. 16. 
Deputy Eyre also stated that the call was dispatched as "[a] man 
with a gun or a fight call." M. Tr. 29. 
Deputy Adamson talked with Barlow when he arrived. Barlow 
told him that one of the persons in car #2 had been waving around 
a handgun. M. Tr. 8. Deputy Adamson saw "several parties that 
were still handcuffed on the ground " in front of the vehicle. M. 
Tr. 9, 17. Barlow was handcuffed as well and the gun had been 
taken from the person who had been waving it around. M. Tr. 16. 
All parties involved in the incident were handcuffed and in police 
custody. M. Tr. 17. Deputy Eyre's version agrees with Deputy 
Adamson's--all suspects were handcuffed and in police custody 
before the search of the car occurred. At least one individual, if 
not more, was lying face down on the parking lot when he arrived. 
M. Tr. 37-39. The gun had been confiscated from the suspect who 
was waving it around. M. Tr. 29-30. 
After handcuffing and placing all suspects on the ground, 
Deputies Adamson and Eyre searched car #1. Adamson states the 
reason for the search: "[W]e already had a firearm that had been 
recovered and we felt for our safety that we needed to make sure 
that there were no other firearms involved. And we didn't want to 
release the car to anyone until we knew. You know, if we let 
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someone go sit in a car while we conducted our interview that our 
safety wouldn't be in jeopardy if there was another weapon inside 
that vehicle." M. Tr. 13-14. Eyre said, "I didn't want somebody 
getting back in that car without making sure they also didn't have 
weapons in it because it was a situation involving guns. I wanted 
to make sure that whoever got back into that car didn't have access 
to other weapons. And so my main feeling at that time was one of 
safety." M. Tr. 32. 
The officers recovered a black fannypack from the floor of the 
passenger's front seat. M. Tr. 9, 33. After picking it up, the 
officers noticed that the fannypack had a velcro tear-away pouch 
which contained a loaded Smith & Wesson ".38 special". M. Tr. 12, 
33-34. Eventually, Mr. Barlow was charged with Carrying a 
Concealed Dangerous Weapon. Car #1 was released to Todd Mitchell 
after the officers had concluded their investigation. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The officers conducted an illegal search and seizure of Daniel 
Barlow's fannypack because the officers did not obtain a warrant 
before the search nor did the search qualify as an exception to the 
warrant requirement. Specifically, the search did not qualify as 
a valid protective search because all of the suspects were 
handcuffed and unable to obtain any possible weapon that was in the 
vehicle. As such, the search was in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, section 
14 of the Utah Constitution. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. A WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF AN AUTOMOBILE FOR WEAPONS IS NOT 
JUSTIFIED BY THE "PROTECTIVE SEARCH" EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT 
REQUIREMENT WHEN ALL OF THE SUSPECTS HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED, 
HANDCUFFED AND REMOVED FROM CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THE SCENE OF THE 
INCIDENT. 
The Appellant, Mr. Barlow, does not contest the initial action 
of the officers taking him (Barlow) into custody by handcuffing him 
and removing him from the scene. However, the subsequent search of 
the vehicle for weapons was unreasonable pursuant to Amendment IV 
of the United States Constitution and Article 1, section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution. "Warrantless seizures and searches are per se 
unreasonable unless the exigencies of the situation justify an 
exception." State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119, 123 (Utah 1983) citing 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 
(1967) . 
A. Immediate Control of Weapons 
One such exception allowing a warrantless search is when an 
officer "has specific articulable facts which reasonably warrant 
the officer to believe that the suspect is dangerous and may gain 
immediate control of weapons". State v. Strickling, 844 P.2d 979 
(Utah App. 1992) citing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 103 S.Ct. 
3469 (1983) . If this is the case, the officer can search the 
suspect and those nearby areas where a weapon may be hidden and a 
suspect may gain immediate access to that weapon. 
In Strickling, the Utah Court of Appeals upheld a patdown 
search of a vehicle's occupants and the subsequent search of the 
6 
vehicle on the basis that the officer was legitimately concerned 
for his safety. The standard for evaluating this question is 
"whether a reasonably prudent man in [these] circumstances would be 
warranted in the belief that his safety . . . was in danger." 
Stricklina 844 P.2d at 984, quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 
88 S.Ct. 1868v 1883, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). 
Although the standard for determining whether an officer 
legitimately feared for his safety is an objective one, the 
officer's subjective intent is a relevant inquiry as well. Id. 
See also State v. Muir. 777 P. 2d 1238 (Idaho App. 1989) . The 
court emphasized the fact that the officer took precautions for his 
safety by waiting for backup and taking cover behind a tree before 
the situation was stabilized. In the present case, the officers 
claim to be concerned for their safety, yet their actions do not 
indicate that concern. If they were concerned for their safety 
from a suspect who was in handcuffs, why weren't Mr. Barlow and the 
others frisked prior to the search of the car? There was no need 
to "take cover" or call for backup because the threat had already 
been diffused. A reasonable officer in the present situation would 
not be reasonably concerned for his or her safety. The call was 
dispatched as "[a] man with a gun or a fight call." M. Tr. 29. 
Before searching the car, the gun had been confiscated from the man 
waving it around. M. Tr. 16. There was no reason to believe that 
more weapons were involved. 
The case at bar can be distinguished from Stricklina in 
several respects. In Stricklina, an officer observed two males 
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exit a Monte Carlo in the alley next to a fraternity house at 1:45 
a.m. The men pressed their faces up to the window of a car parked 
in that alley. When the officer approached them, they fled by 
jumping into the Monte Carlo and "peeling out". The officer had 
confronted these individuals earlier in the evening and had reason 
to believe that they were not fraternity members. The officer was 
also aware of reports of vehicle burglaries in the area earlier 
that night. 
After stopping the Monte Carlo, the passenger stepped out of 
the car, whereupon the officer ordered him back into the car. The 
officer called for backup and "took cover" behind a nearby tree. 
While waiting for backup, the passenger made a furtive movement by 
placing or removing something from underneath his seat. When 
backup arrived, the occupants were ordered to stand at the rear of 
the vehicle. While the suspects were standing near the rear of the 
Monte Carlo in the company of the backup officer, the original 
officer at the scene searched the passenger compartment of the car 
and discovered some stereo equipment. 
In the present case, the situation was much different. Any 
threat to the officers or the public was completely diffused. All 
suspects were handcuffed and in police custody, and at least some 
of the suspects were face down on the parking lot pavement. M. Tr. 
9, 17. And the gun had been confiscated from the suspect who was 
waving it around. M. Tr. 29-30. Unlike the officer in Strickling, 
there was no reason for the officers in the case at bar to take 
cover or other precautions because the situation was under control. 
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The officers never stated that :hey felt immediate concern for 
their safety. Deputy Adamson's only concern was for some possible 
future threat: "[W]e already had a firearm that had been recovered 
and we felt for our safety that we needed to make sure that there 
were no other firearms involved. And we didn't want to release the 
car to anyone until we knew. You know, if we let someone go sit in 
a car while we conducted our interview that our safety wouldn't be 
in jeopardy if there was another weapon inside that vehicle." M. 
Tr. 13-14. Deputy Eyre expressed the same fear of a future threat 
when he stated, "I didn't want somebody getting back in that car 
without making sure they also didn't have weapons in it because it 
was a situation involving guns. I wanted to make sure that whoever 
got back into that car didn't have access to other weapons. And so 
my main feeling at that time was one of safety." M. Tr. 32. 
The case law, however, does not justify a search based on a 
future threat to officers or the public--the threat must be 
immediate. The officer must be concerned that the suspect is 
dangerous and will gain immediate control of a weapon. Stricklincr, 
844 at 983 quoting Long, 463 U.S. at 1049-50, 103 S.Ct. at 3481. 
The search must be limited to the "area into which an arrestee 
might reach in order to grab a weapon." Thus, an officer may 
search the passenger compartment of a vehicle, but cannot search 
the trunk. Id. at 1050, 103 S.Ct. at 3480 (quoting Chime 1 v. 
California, 395 U.S. 752, 763, 89 S. Ct. 2034, 2040, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 
(1969)). 
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The fact that an officer can only search the passenger 
compartment of a vehicle suggests that "immediate control" really 
means "immediate threat". Otherwise, an officer would be allowed 
to search the trunk. A weapon in the trunk is not an immediate 
threat because the suspect would need to have his key to open it. 
Before getting a weapon out of the trunk, the officer would have 
time to respond to the threat. 
In the same way, the gun in the fannypack was not in Barlow's 
immediate control. As he was handcuffed and face down on the 
pavement of the parking lot under the watchful eye of many 
officers, Barlow was not a threat to anyone. Daniel Barlow had no 
access to that fannypack. Just as an officer may not search the 
trunk of a vehicle for weapons, so should he not be allowed to 
search the passenger compartment of a vehicle when there is no 
threat to the officers' safety. The safety exception to the 
warrant requirement allows for diffusing only immediate threats to 
officers' safety. 
Also supporting this notion is that the court in Strickling 
relied heavily on the Supreme Court's emphasis in Long that a 
suspect might "break away from police control and retrieve a weapon 
from his automobile". Strickling 844 P.2d at 984, quoting Long, 
463 U.S. at 1052, 103 S.Ct. at 3482. This may be true in 
situations like Strickling where the suspects were standing at the 
back of the car, unhandcuffed, in the custody of only one officer 
or, in Long where the suspect was about to reenter the vehicle (see 
Long facts infra). In both of these cases, the officers were in 
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immediate danger--the situations had not been stabilized as they 
had been in the present case. 
In Long, officers observed a car swerve into a ditch in a 
rural area. When the officers went to investigate, they were met 
at the rear of the car by the driver who "appeared to be under the 
influence of something". As the driver was walking back toward his 
car, the officers noticed a hunting knife on the floor of the car. 
The driver was stopped and frisked. Then, while the driver was 
detained by one officer, the other searched the vehicle for weapons 
and recovered some marijuana. The driver was in the custody of one 
police officer during the search, but he was not handcuffed. 
The United States Supreme Court upheld the search of the 
interior of the car as a valid protective search. The Court 
employed a "balancing test" weighing the reasonableness of the 
governmental intrusion against the invasion of a citizen's privacy. 
Terrv v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 44 
Ohio Ops.2d 383. In finding the search constitutionally 
permissible, the Court placed great significance on the fact that 
a suspect in the defendant's position might "break away from police 
control and retrieve a weapon from his automobile." Strickling, 
844 P.2d at 984, quoting Long 463 U.S. at 1052, 77 L.Ed.2d at 1221, 
103 S.Ct. at 3482. 
In two other Utah cases, the court found that the officers 
were justified in conducting a warrantless protective search. 
State v. Bradford, 839 P.2d 866 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Cole, 
674 P. 2d 119 (Utah 1983) . These two cases can be distinguished 
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factually from the present case, however. In Bradford, the suspect 
was an immediate threat to the officer. The officer stopped a car 
in a rural area at 6:24 a.m. for speeding. There was a .22 caliber 
rifle in plain view in the car, and it appeared that the suspect 
was "on something." While the officer was doing a registration 
check, the suspect moved a bag toward him from the back of the car. 
Unlike Bradford, the present case occurred in the presence of 
many officers and the search was conducted after all suspects were 
handcuffed and unable to present a threat to the officers. M. Tr. 
9, 17. In Cole as well as Bradford, the suspect posed an immediate 
threat to the officers. The suspect was not in police custody when 
officers saw him remove a gun case from the vehicle after being 
told that there were no weapons in the vehicle. 
B. State Constitutional Analysis 
Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures 
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing 
to be seized. 
It is well established that Utah is free to interpret Article 
I, section 14 of its state constitution differently from the fourth 
amendment to the United States Constitution. See State v. Larocco, 
794 P.2d 460, 465-6 (Utah 1990); State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219 
(Utah 1988); State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803 (Utah 1896; State v. 
Laffertv, 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 n.5 (Utah 1988); State v. Hvqh, 711 
P.2d 264, 271-72 (Utah 1985) (Zimmerman, J., concurring). 
This Court and the Utah Supreme Court have acknowledged that 
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federal law under the fourth amendment has become "a labyrinth of 
rules built upon a series of contradictory and confusing 
rationalizations and distinctions" (Hygh, 711 P.2d at 271-2) and 
that in certain contexts, a distinct analysis under Article I 
section 14 of the Utah constitution may be preferable to a fourth 
amendment analysis. Id. see also State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 89, 95 
n.7 (Utah App. 1987) (overruled; id. at 103-5 (Billings, J., 
concurring and dissenting). 
In Larocco, 794 P.2d at 465, the majority opinion by the 
Supreme Court (J. Stewart clarified that he was not part of the 
majority embracing the state constitutional analysis in Larocco) 
centered on Article I, section 14 in the decision that "an 
officer's opening a car door to examine a VIN on a door jam" 
constituted an unreasonable search under the state constitution. 
The Court recognized that federal fourth amendment law, especially 
in the context of automobile searches, "has been a source of much 
confusion among judges, lawyers and police." Id. at 466. Although 
the court " would hold that a search was conducted within the 
meaning of the fourth amendment," it nevertheless reached its 
decision under the state constitution. The Court stated: 
The time has come for this court, in applying an automobile 
exception to the warrant requirement of article I, section 14 
of the Utah Constitution, to try to simplify, if possible, the 
search and seizure rules so that they can be more easily 
followed by the police and courts and, at the same time, 
provide the public with consistent and predictable protection 
against unreasonable searches and seizures. 
See also State v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 
(roadblock violates Article I, section 14 of the Utah 
13 
Constitution); State v. Thompson, 810 P. 2d 415 (Utah 1991) (holding 
that bank customers have a right of privacy in bank records under 
Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution). 
Case law from Utah and other jurisdictions supports a distinct 
analysis under Article I section 14 where an officer conducts a 
protective search of a vehicle for weapons. 
As stated supra at pp. 6-12, before upholding a valid 
protective search of a vehicle, both the Utah Court of Appeals and 
the Utah Supreme Court require specific facts which show that an 
officer is in immediate danger from a suspect (i.e. lateness of the 
hour, rural area, suspect "on something", only one or two officers 
present, officer(s) required to take cover, occupants make "furtive 
movements" for possible weapon, weapon observed in vehicle by the 
officer, and perhaps most importantly, suspect is not handcuffed 
and may break away from officers' temporary custody to obtain a 
weapon) . Stricklina 844 P.2d 979 (Utah App. 1992); Bradford 839 
P.2d 866 (Utah App. 1992); Cole, 674 P.2d 119 (Utah 1983). 
In Idaho, an officer must express immediate concern for his or 
her safety before a protective search of a vehicle can be 
conducted. State v. Muir, 777 P. 2d 1238 (Idaho App. 1989) . In 
Muir, two suspects were under surveillance for illegal drug 
activity and breaking into vending machines. As the two were 
seated in a vehicle, three officers approached the car to question 
the suspects. In plain view in the vehicle were jewelers' files 
and bolt cutters protruding from under one of the seats. As the 
suspects were being questioned outside of the vehicle, one of the 
14 
suspects darted toward the open door of the suspects' vehicle. At 
this point, the officers conducted a protective search of the 
vehicle, in which knife as well as the bolt cutters were 
recovered. 
Important factors for the Idaho Court of Appeals in holding 
that the officers were not justified in conducting a protective 
search of the car for weapons are: 1) the suspects were not frisked 
before search of the vehicle, suggesting that the officers felt no 
immediate concern for their safety; and 2) the officers removed any 
potential danger posed by the suspects because the suspects were 
never allowed to reenter the vehicle. JId. at 1241. 
The suspects in the present case, as those in Muir, were never 
frisked (frisk of their persons) before the automobile frisk was 
conducted. A reasonable officer who was concerned about his safety 
would first conduct a patdown frisk of suspects before conducting 
a frisk of the vehicle. The officers were merely conducting a 
fishing expedition when they searched the Barlow car--they were not 
concerned for their safety. 
As to factor (2) above, the officers in the present case also 
removed any potential danger posed by the suspects by handcuffing 
and placing them face down on the parking lot pavement. M. Tr. 9, 
17, 37-39. As pointed out supra at p. 11, Strickling and 
Bradford, both Utah cases, relied heavily on the Supreme Court's 
emphasis in Long that a suspect might "break away from police 
control and retrieve a weapon from his automobile". Stricklinq 844 
P.2d at 984, and Bradford, 839 P. 2d 870, quoting Long, 463 U.S. at 
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1052, 103 S.Ct. at 3482. In both Stricklina and Bradford, the 
officers were in immediate danger--the situations had not been 
stabilized as they had been in the present case. 
Thus, the Utah Court of Appeals, using a state constitutional 
rationale, is in agreement with the Idaho Court of Appeals that the 
officer must have immediate concern for his or her safety--not some 
possible future harm for safety. In other words, the officer must 
be concerned that the suspect is dangerous and will gain immediate 
control of a weapon. Stricklina. 844 at 983 quoting Long, 463 U.S. 
at 1049-50, 103 S.Ct. at 3481. For the Utah Court of Appeals 
"immediate control" really means "immediate threat". The Appellant 
encourages the Court of Appeals to adopt this meaning of immediate 
control. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant asks the court to find that the search of 
appellant's fannypack located in the vehicle without a warrant was 
illegal pursuant to the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution and Article 1, section 14 of the Utah State 
Constitution. 
SUBMITTED this | I day of January, 1995. 
Attorney for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
76-10-504 CRIMINAL CODE 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 79 Am. Jur. 2d Weapons state statute making it illegal for felon to have 
and Firearms § 29. possession or control of firearm or other dan-
C.J.S. — 94 C.J.S. Weapons § 2. gerous weapon, 66 A.L.R 4th 1240. 
A.L.R. — What amount to "control" under Key Numbers. — Weapons *» 2. 
76-10-504. Carrying concealed dangerous weapon. 
(1) Any person, except those persons described in Section 76-10-503 and 
those persons exempted under Section 76-10-510, carrying a concealed dan-
gerous weapon, as defined in this Part 5, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor, 
except that a firearm that contains no ammunition and is enclosed in a case, 
gun box, or securely-tied package shall not be considered a concealed weapon, 
but: 
(a) If the dangerous weapon is a firearm and contains no ammunition, 
he shall be guilty of a class B misdemeanor; 
(b) If the dangerous weapon is a firearm and contains ammunition, he 
shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor; or 
(c) If the dangerous weapon is a sawed-off shotgun, or if the dangerous 
weapon is a firearm and is used to commit a crime of violence, he shall be 
guilty of a felony of the third degree. 
(2) Nothing in this Part 5 shall prevent any person, except persons de-
scribed in Section 76-10-503, from keeping within his place of residence, place 
of business, or any vehicle under his control any firearm, except that it shall 
be a class B misdemeanor to carry a loaded firearm in a vehicle. 
History: C. 1953, 76-10-504, enacted by L. 9 76-10-504), relating to carrying concealed 
1982, ch. 17, 5 1. dangerous weapons, and enacted present 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1982, § 76-10-504. 
ch 17, § 1 repealed former § 76-10-504 (C. Cross-References. — Cities may prohibit 
1953, 76*10-504, enacted by 1973, ch. 196, carrying concealed weapons, S 10-8-48. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS constitute "carrying*' within the meaning of 
this section. State v. Williams, 636 P.2d 1092 
"Carrying."
 ( U t a h 1 9 8 1 ) 
Lesser included offenses. 
Lesser included offenses. 
A ^ r L n will be deemed to be "carrying" a ^he offense of carrying a loaded firearm in a 
concealed weapon where such weapon is shown vf *«*?• « 7610-505, is not a necessarily in-
to be under the person's control and within his ci«oed offense of carrying a concealed danger-
immediate, easy or ready access; it is not re- <>U8 weapon. State v. Williams, 636 P.2d 1092 
quired that the weapon be upon one's person to (Utah 1981). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 79 Am. Jur. 2d Weapons Scope and effect of exception, in statute for-
and Firearms § 8. bidding carrying of weapons, as to person on 
C.J.S. — 94 C.J S. Weapons § 3. hie own premises or at his place of business, 57 
A.L.R. — Validity and construction of gun A.L.R.3d 938. 
control laws, 28 A.L.R.3d 845. Key Numbers. — Weapons *» 6. 
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76-10-505. Carrying loaded firearm in vehicle or on street 
Every person who carries a loaded firearm in a vehicle or on any public 
street in an incorporated city or in a prohibited area of an unincorporated 
territory within this state is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
History: C. 1953, 76-10-505, enacted by L. Cross-References. — Carrying loaded fire-
1973, ch. 196, § 76-10-505. arm in vehicle prohibited, 5 23-20-21. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Lesser included offense. carrying a concealed dangerous weapon, 
The offense of carrying a loaded firearm in a § 76-10-504 State v. Williams, 636 P.2d 1092 
vehicle is not a necessarily included offense of (Utah 1981). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 79 Am. Jur. 2d Weapons C.J.8. — 94 C.J.S. Weapons § 8. 
and Firearms § 12. Key Numbers. — Weapons *» 10. 
76-10-506. Threatening with or using dangerous weapon 
in fight or quarrel. 
Every person, except those persons described in Section 76-10-503, who, not 
in necessary self defense in the presence of two or more persons, draws or 
exhibits any dangerous weapon in an angry and threatening manner or un-
lawfully uses the same in any fight or quarrel is guilty of a class B misde-
meanor. 
History: C. 1953, 76-10-506, enacted by L. Cross-References. — Aggravated assault, 
1973, ch. 196, ft 76-10-506. § 76-5-103. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Aggravated assault. committed by use .of a deadly weapon, 
Aggravated assault, § 76-5-103, committed § 76-5-103, was entitled to a jury instruction 
by use of a deadly weapon IB not the same regarding offense of threatening with a dan-
crime proscribed by this section, and a person gerous weapon as a lesser included offense 
convicted of aggravated assault is not entitled where two offenses had overlapping elements, 
to receive the misdemeanor penalty provided facts of case tended to prove both offenses, and 
by this section, but is to be sentenced under evidence was subject to an interpretation 
§ 76-5-103. State v. Verdin, 595 P.2d 862 which provided both a rational basis for a ver-
(Utah 1979). See also Green v. Turner, 409 diet acquitting defendant of aggravated assault 
F.2d 215 (10th Cir. 1969) (same conclusion un- charge and convicting him of threatening with 
der former law). a dangerous weapon. State v. Oldroyd, 685 
Defendant charged with aggravated assault P.2d 551 (Utah 1984). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 79 Am. Jur. 2d Weapons C.J.8. — 94 CJ.S. Weapons § 16. 
and Firearms § 29. Key Numbers. — Weapons •= 14. 
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